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Around the 90-year anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, it
is important to remember the international effort that went
into responding to the new diseases, which appeared during
the First World War, such as trench nephritis. This condition
arose among soldiers in spring 1915, characterized by
breathlessness, swelling of the face or legs, headache, sore
throat, and the presence of albumin and renal casts in urine.
It was speedily investigated by the military-medical
authorities. There was debate over whether it was new
condition or streptococcal nephritis, and the experts agreed
that it was a new condition. The major etiologies proposed
were infection, exposure, and diet (including poisons).
Research pointed to the origin of the disease as being
infective rather than toxic, but no definite cause was
discovered. A number of labels were given to the disease,
including war nephritis. However, trench nephritis was the
one used most widely. Trench nephritis was a serious
problem for the Allies, leading to 35 000 casualties in the
British and 2000 in the American forces. There were also
hundreds of deaths. The condition was treated in line with
pre-war regimens designed for acute nephritis. No significant
preventative methods were implemented for trench
nephritis, as there was no consensus regarding causation.
The medical response to trench nephritis was largely
ineffective, with medical commentators recognizing that
there had been a lack of medical progress.
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Around the 90-year anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, it
is important to remember the international effort that went
into responding to the new diseases, which appeared during
the First World War, such as trench nephritis. Historical
sources show that an epidemic of ‘trench nephritis’ during
World War I may have been hantavirus induced, which was
first isolated in 1976 from the lungs of the striped field mouse
Apodemus agrarius.1–3
SYMPTOMS AND SIGNS
In the spring of 1915, Medical Officers began to receive
reports of a new actor emerging on the battlefields of France.
On 4 April 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel FA Symonds, Com-
manding Officer of No. 1 Casualty Clearing Station, 1st
Army, reported in his diary: ‘Dispatched by road 6 cases of
albuminuria to No. 10 Stationary hospital, St OMER. There
is at present a slight outbreak of acute nephritis which we are
attempting to trace cause to.’4 A couple of days later, he
added: ‘The small epidemic of albuminuria which has come
under my notice is causing considerable interest. Here is
marked oedema, severe albuminuria and a rise of tempera-
tureyWhat is this disease and what is its cause?’4 A special
correspondent went on to describe the most common
symptoms of this affliction:
Its outstanding phenomena are those commonly resulting
from sub-acute nephritis, including general dropsy and
the presence of albumin and renal casts in the urine. In
most cases the onset of these phenomena seems to be
rather sudden, but a history of a few days precedent sore
throat or bronchial catarrh can commonly be obtained.5
The main symptoms were breathlessness, swelling of the face
or legs, headache, and sore throat.6 Not surprisingly, the
discovery of a previously unknown condition proved to be
controversial. There was debate over whether it was a new
disease or one already in existence, namely streptococcal
nephritis. The idea was attacked by clinicians on the home
front. For example, Dr R Saundby7 wrote from Birmingham:
Sir – I do not know who is responsible for labelling a
streptococcal nephritis a ‘new disease’ but it seems to me
strange to do so. It has been well known to me – and I
wager to many other clinicists – for many years that
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nephritis may follow non-specific sore throatsyMore-
over, it is a familiar fact that streptococcal infection may
give rise to nephritis...so there is not only nothing new in
this particular disease, but it is merely an illustration of a
quite well known pathological process.
However, this letter failed to generate further debate in the
medical press.
A few months later, Lieutenant-Colonel N Raw8 reported
on five cases of the ‘novel’ condition, which he termed ‘trench
nephritis.’ In his opinion, ‘trench nephritis’ was an apt name
because there, for the first time, seemed to be a clear
association between the disease and trench warfare conditions.
It is significant that trench nephritis soon provoked active
investigation by the medical authorities. Sir William Leish-
man, Pathological Advisor to the British Expeditionary Force,
took a keen interest in trench nephritis. As early as May 1915,
he had discussed the recent series of cases of nephritis with Sir
William Beveridge, head of army sanitation services.9 About
100 of these had been reported during the previous month in
scattered units. Leishman noted: ‘from the medical point of
view, they appear to present a number of unusual features,
notably the rapid way in which they clear up when admitted
to hospital.’9 A couple of weeks later, the consulting physician,
Colonel John Rose Bradford, called to see him.9 Bradford was
a trained physician and physiologist,10 and an eminent renal
specialist, having performed important early experimental
work on this organ.11 For these reasons, Bradford’s opinion,
that trench nephritis was a new condition,9 was authoritative.
This burst of activity among those high up in the military-
medical hierarchy was soon mirrored on the home front. In
November 1915, an editorial in the Medical Press & Circular
described trench nephritis as an ‘epidemic’ and noted its
distinctive clinical features, including the frequency with
which shortness of breath occurred, its great variability in
duration, a tendency to remission and relapse, and an
ultimately favorable prognosis.12 A discussion on the ‘new
epidemic,’ involving a number of influential experts, was held
at the Royal Society of Medicine in February 1916.13 The
opinion of Sir William Osler, Regius professor of medicine at
Oxford, that trench nephritis was a novel condition, was
widely endorsed. This forum’s acceptance of the condition
gave it legitimacy.
SEARCH FOR A CAUSE
The major etiologies debated for trench nephritis, both in
France and the UK, included infection, exposure, and diet
(including poisons).
Writing in the BMJ, Sir Thomas Oliver14 firmly attributed
blame to exposure, as, in his experience, many combatants
associated the disease with the effects of trench warfare. He
used the analogy of rheumatism to explain why exposure
could potentially be the cause:
Is there any reason why the conditions which give rise to
the joint and muscular pains should not in some instances
operate upon a larger area of the body so as to include the
kidneys as well? The vessels of these organs are extremely
sensitive to changes in temperature.14
He went on to recount specific examples where nephritis had
definitely been attributed to exposure. For example, the
Germans had reported that the disease occurred in a
particular division of their army among those soldiers that
had slept on bare pavement, but not among those who had
lain on wooden boards.14
Diet was also assigned a role in the causation of trench
nephritis. Captain JW McLeod and the Frenchman Major P
Ameuille15 conducted extensive research on the connection
between diet and trench nephritis, concluding that the
vitality of the men’s kidneys could be lowered by their low
vitamin C intake during wartime. This, in turn, led to kidney
failure, as a consequence of the excessive metabolic effort
required to process a high-protein diet. However, Captain
WL Brown16 disagreed with their argument, believing it was
improbable that 180 g of protein could cause nephritis in a
group of otherwise healthy men.
Another idea circulated during the war was that trench
nephritis might be owing to the consumption of dietary
poisons. As a result of research undertaken, Bull17 concluded
that trench nephritis was caused by excessive chlorine in the
drinking water, combined with the harmful conditions of
trench warfare, such as exposure. Another poison, proposed
by Oliver,14 was dietary lead. Oliver had analyzed the urine of
29 of his patients, finding lead in about half. He had tried to
locate the source of this metal. An examination of their bully
beef ration had yielded traces of lead, but not enough to
cause illness. Metallic scrapings from the inside of the men’s
cooking pans had also tested negative for lead. Lastly, he had
tried the effects of sterilized and non-sterilized, chlorinated
and non-chlorinated water on the tins, but none had caused
any leaching. He then hit upon a brilliant idea – maybe lead
was escaping from bodily retained bullets and shrapnel? In
support of this theory was the fact that he had found lead in
the urine of a soldier with shrapnel in the knee and shoulder,
as well as other wounded men that he had examined.14
Other commentators were more explicit in linking trench
nephritis and trench warfare. AG Fleming et al.,18 suggested
that most of their sufferers had drunk trench or shell-hole
water. Sundell and Nankivell19 postulated a relationship
between the nephritis and inhalation of irritant gases, and
opened up the corpses of soldiers to learn more about the
disease process. On examining these post-mortem specimens,
Sundell and Nankivell discovered that they showed a diffuse
intra-capillary glomerulonephritis; similar changes had
already been observed in chlorine gassing. Maher20 proposed
that pathological features of trench nephritis included
glomerular ischemia, capilary thrombi, endocapillary pro-
liferation, and frequently epithelial crescents, suggesting an
underlying vasculitis.
There were those who believed the disease could only be
caused by a specific organism, which, with luck, could be
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isolated and cultured. In a memorandum circulated in July
1915, Colonel S Westcott, DDMS 1st Corps, noted: ‘The
specialists who are investigating epidemic dropsy are inclined
to attribute its cause to specific infections such as scarlet
fever, measles, German measles, tonsillitis etc.’21 Dr JC
McWalter, writing in the same year, reported locating the
organism Balantidium coli in the urine of nephritis sufferers.
As most of the cases had received an anti-typhoid inoculation
before going to the front, he postulated that the disease might
be a modified form of enteric fever.22 In October 1915,
Captain RG Abercrombie suggested that the cause of trench
nephritis might be influenza, only to backtrack when he was
unable to find this organism in the urine. He therefore played
safe, stating: ‘the writer is inclined to the belief that the
disease is an infection by a definite organism, the nature of
which is at present undiscovered.’23
The majority of doctors considered a mixture of
environmental, dietary, and infectious causes for trench
nephritis. One of this group, Major BW Hogarth, a 49-year-
old general practitioner and a former territorial force
combatant,24 described his investigation of 75 cases of
albuminuria in his division in France, all men who had
spent time in the trenches.25 A mature doctor, with extensive
clinical experience, it is not surprising that he first examined
the influence of exposure. Most of the soldiers had been
severely affected by this, although he related (perhaps light-
heartedly) that one case (No. 12) had ‘not been exposed
nearly so much here as at home.’25 In 17 cases, he was able to
link exposure to the onset of nephritis, although it was
excluded in a further 15:
In the remainder of the cases there was generally a history
of excessive sweating on the march up to the trenches, or
some other form of exertion, followed by standing still or
lying in their damp clothes or lying on cold ground
without blankets. The sudden and great alteration in
surface temperature under these circumstances appears to
me to be the great predisposing cause of the illness.25
In his opinion, therefore, surface temperature was significant
in etiology. However, Hogarth25 also considered dietary
factors in the etiology of the disease. Ultimately, he believed
that nutrition was an unlikely cause, because of the variability
of the soldiers’ diet. He also ruled out alcohol consumption,
as total abstainers had also succumbed. He examined the
drinking water, supplied to the troops on carts, as some of his
men had reported that this tasted ‘funny.’ However, virtually
all the men took their water as tea, rendering the water safe
for drinking. In addition to exposure and diet, it is significant
that Hogarth25 also examined an infectious causation for
trench nephritis, although he failed to discover any link
between the condition and other infections, including scarlet
and enteric fevers. He finally concluded that as a series of
cases, nephritis could be most aptly compared with
pneumonia, which, although a specific disease, was predis-
posed to by chills.
Concurrent with speculation and debate on the etiology of
trench nephritis, investigations were being carried out into
the condition. A number of these were pursued on a small
scale, by individual researchers in the field or in laboratories.
In 1915, a special inquiry into trench nephritis was opened,
called the Committee on War (Trench) Nephritis. After
2 years, another body, the BEF Nephritis Sub-committee, was
established in France. The Committee on War (Trench)
Nephritis, sponsored and funded by the Medical Research
Committee (MRC), mounted surveillance into the condition
and also investigated epidemiological factors. It collected
together a number of cases in France for observation by
Bradford, and organized biological and chemical examina-
tions by Major Wolf at the Base Hygiene Laboratory.26 In the
UK, it arranged for cases to be investigated by a team headed
by Brown27 at St Bartholomew’s Hospital. Brown’s team
published a preliminary report in July 1915, arguing in favor
of an ultramicroscopic virus as the infective cause of trench
nephritis. It was also influential, as the DMS, 1st Army,
specifically mentioned that he had received a copy from
Beveridge.21
However, not everyone agreed that a filter-passing virus
caused trench nephritis. For example, Lieutenant RL
Thornley of No. 12 Mobile Laboratory examined blood
samples taken from trench nephritics admitted to his
Casualty Clearing Station by incubating them on agar
medium for 5 days.28 Slides were then stained with carbol-
fuchsin and examined under a microscope. He discovered
that every one of the 27 cases showed the presence of an
identical coccus. He inoculated a rat and a guinea-pig with an
emulsion of this organism. The rat became sick and then
recovered within 24 h, although the guinea-pig seemed
unaffected. On dissection of the rat, its spleen was enlarged
and he was able to recover his microbe from it. However, he
was unable to clearly link the presence of the coccus with the
disease. In fact, in the same month that his article appeared,
the Commanding Officer of No. 2 Mobile Laboratory
reported that Leishman had told him that the ‘so-called
Micrococcus nephritis found...byyThornley has proved to be
the Streptococcus faecalis or Enterococcus.’29 It was therefore a
contaminant and not the true organism of the disease.
The second body to research trench nephritis, the BEF
Nephritis Sub-committee, was founded in February 1917.
Basing its research at No. 46 General Hospital, Etaples, it
recruited with the MRC Captain JA Wilson to fully investigate
the bacteriology of trench nephritis.30 In the official report of
his investigations, published in 1918, Wilson stated that he
was able to isolate many different microbes from the urine of
these patients.30 In his estimation, however, these organisms
were saprophytes and not related to the disease process. The
blood had also proven sterile and smears taken from the
tonsils produced no interesting organisms. Lastly, throat
swabs from patients and 30 healthy volunteers were cultured.
The flora in the trench nephritis cases was similar to the
healthy controls, except for a higher incidence of streptococci,
although complement fixation directed against these organi-
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sms proved negative. In their final report, the MRC simply
stated that trench nephritis was an infective disease caused by
an unknown organism.31 Interestingly, they added that it was
‘probably propagated by lice or other vermin under trench
conditions,’ without qualifying this statement.31
Another series of experiments conducted in France was
concerned with investigating the relationship between trench
nephritis and albuminuria, the cardinal sign of a weakened
kidney. In a paper published in September, McLeod, along
with his collaborator Ameuille, noted the large number of
cases of acute nephritis in the British army and stated:
All this points to one of two things – either an infectious
agent which is afforded particular opportunities owing to
the intermingling of large bodies of men and so is able to
attack a large number of susceptible individuals who in
their everyday life had no contact with such infection, or
some conditions associated with trench warfare which put
an excessive strain upon the kidney.15
The kidney could experience strain in one of two ways. It
could be secondary to cold and chills and an alien diet, or the
organ could sustain damage by coming in contact with
circulating bacterial toxins. If the former mechanism was
operating, it should have been possible to find symptomless
albuminuria where nephritis was most rife – among British
troops in the trenches. To investigate this, McLeod and
Ameuille surveyed the incidence of albuminuria in five classes
of troops: Class 1, 1861 French troops, territorial infantry just
returned from the trenches: 1.66%; Class 2, 2220 British
troops examined at a divisional barracks: 4.8%; Class 3, 311
British troops who had spent a long time in the trenches
during the coldest part of the winter: 3.53%; Class 4, 2096
men living in billets in conditions similar to those found at
home: 2.91%; Class 5, 553 men recently recruited from
England and in heavy training: 10.12%. The most surprising
finding was the high incidence of albuminuria amongst
troops in heavy training in Britain. As trench nephritis was
rare at home, this seemed to disprove a connection between
asymptomatic albuminuria and nephritis, and suggested that
the frequent and prolonged exposures associated with trench
warfare did not produce degeneration of the kidney
independently of other causes. Furthermore, McLeod and
Ameuille termed the high level of albuminuria in training
men ‘fatigue albuminuria’ and this explained the higher
incidence in the divisional men compared with those in the
trenches, as the former were exercising more strenuously than
the latter. The second significant result was the lower figure
for the French troops compared to the British. McLeod and
Ameuille concluded that this was owing to dietary factors,
with the average British soldier consuming protein in excess
of his bodily requirements, throwing greater strain on the
kidneys.
To finally resolve the controversy over the link between
albuminuria and trench nephritis, the physiological chemist
MacLean and de Wesselow32 conducted an extensive
investigation for the Nephritis Sub-committee. His final
report concluded: ‘Taken together, all the results of this work
pointed clearly to the origin of the disease as being infective
rather than toxic, but no further light has been obtained
upon the question of the nature of the infection.’32 This
became the consensus view in the medical ranks. In June
1918, at a meeting of the Medical Investigation Committee, it
was decided to stop further research on this disease.9
LABELLING
When the disease first appeared, various names were attached
to it such as ‘acute nephritis,’ ‘epidemic nephritis,’ and ‘trench
kidney.’33 Gradually, the term ‘trench nephritis was adopted.’8
However, some authors wrote to the medical press, disagree-
ing with this label. For example, writing in August 1916,
Abercrombie34 suggested that the term was misleading, as
many of the affected soldiers had never been in the trenches
at all. Furthermore, Abercrombie stated that use of this label
ought to be discontinued and the more general ‘war
nephritis’ used in its place. This had some success; the
MRC used the term ‘war nephritis’ in their official report on
the disease.30 However, the condition continued to be called
‘trench nephritis’ by most doctors in the field and on the
home front.
THE THREAT
According to the Official History of the War – Medical Services,
there were approximately 35 000 admissions for trench
nephritis in the BEF during the conflict.35 More importantly,
95% of these cases occurred in front line men.36 For this
reason, the disease had a small but significant impact on the
Army’s manpower. Additionally, the US forces reported 2002
cases of nephritis from April 1917 to the end of the war.37
Trench nephritis was initially viewed by many as a
relatively mild disease, with a mortality numbering only a
few percent, unlike the more serious nephritis that had been
seen in civilian practice before the War. A number of
clinicians believed that the condition would resolve quickly
and was unlikely to compromise a soldier’s military value for
an extended period. In total, there were 400 deaths in the BEF
owing to this condition,35 and the US forces reported only
115 deaths among their 2002 cases.37
In spite of low mortality from trench nephritis, of severe
detriment to the war effort was the fact that patients often
took a long time to recover. Writing in August 1916,
Abercrombie34 stated that he was unsure of the condition’s
long-term prognosis. To answer this question, he had traced
the clinical histories of 171 cases admitted to a ward in a base
hospital in France.38 After undergoing treatment, 3% of the
men died, 18% were invalided during the first period of
home treatment, 12% were invalided after returning to duty,
but the majority (63%) showed no further nephritis.
Nevertheless, the average stay in hospital during the first
period of home treatment was 89 days, a considerable period.
Trench nephritis was the major nephrologic problem of
World War I, accounting for 5% of medical admissions and
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more than 10% of military hospital bed occupancy at that
time.20
This economic consequence, superimposed on the loss of
military manpower, no doubt provided a spur for tackling
the disease.
TREATMENT
The Official History of the War – Medical Services admitted
that no remedy had been found that could cure trench
nephritis.36 Therapy for the condition did not alter
significantly from the disease’s first appearance in 1915 to
the end of the War. As its name suggests, trench nephritis was
recognized as organ-specific. In consequence of the general
belief that nephritis involved an irritated kidney, secondary to
toxic substances that poisoned this organ and not by direct
bacterial invasion,39 calming the inflamed organ seemed the
most logical option. Trench nephritis was therefore treated in
line with pre-war regimens designed for acute nephritis.
These involved removing the source of any poisoning,
‘resting’ the kidneys, and securing the action of the bowels
and skin in eliminating waste products.11 Medical authors
generally recommended bed rest, a milk diet, and the
administration of a weak diuretic. In trench nephritis,
however, as there was no specific causative agent that could
be targeted, drug treatment was purely symptomatic.27 The
fact that no revolutionary therapy was developed is shown by
the fact that the MRC report on the disease did not even
mention treatment.30 Dietetics (control of the diet) dom-
inates the related literature and there is no mention of ‘magic
bullets,’ only symptomatic pharmacology and physical
methods.
PREVENTION
No significant preventative methods were implemented for
trench nephritis, as there was no consensus regarding
causation. Some doctors postulated that the disease might
be owing to a filter-passing virus, although this was never
proven and no vector was found for the organism. This
meant that there was no agent that could be targeted by the
military-medical authorities. Brown40 believed that trench
nephritis resulted from exposure after exertion. He therefore
recommended that men should be warned against cooling
down too quickly after removing their packs and belts at the
end of a march. His investigations had shown that the best
procedure was to fix a thick woolen scarf around the men’s
waists, allowing cooling to take place slowly in the kidney
region. Lieutenant-Colonel PH Henderson41 also noted that
cold and exposure, both of which, in his opinion, could lead
to trench nephritis, could be prevented by the use of hot
blankets, hot water bottles, and hot drinks. In January 1918,
Captain E Brooke-Pike of No. 25 Sanitary Section attended a
sanitary conference at 4th Army Headquarters on trench
nephritis, with Beveridge in the chair.42 The meeting
recommended that drying rooms should be provided at all
camps, especially those of the labor corps, or where more
elderly combatants were housed. This again was a measure
designed to mitigate the effect of exposure in causing the
kidney complaint.
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that the medical response to trench nephritis
was largely ineffective. Medical commentators recognized
that there had been a lack of progress. For example, an
editorial in The Lancet, which appeared in September 1918,
stated:
yit often happens that knowledge of a new disease
advances rapidly, sometimes with tiresome slowness, while
apparently the same amount of work is being put into it
by competent investigators. A strict example of this is
given by war nephritis. The recent report of the Medical
Research Committee is of a negative character, throwing
little or no further light on the nature of the disease.43
Beveridge also singled out this disease, writing: ‘There are still
problems of the late war left undetermined. Although the
incidence of nephritis declined in the last year of the war we
cannot say that we have satisfactorily arrived at the aetiology
of the disease or have laid down adequate measures of
prevention.’44 The medical profession failed to identify with
certainty a causative agent, the Official History of the War –
Medical Services admitting: ‘The ultimate cause of war
nephritis has not been discovered.’45 No preventative
measures could be put into effect for this reason, and no
effective therapy was established. This was in spite of the
setting up of a committee to research the condition in 1915
and a further investigative commission beginning work in
France in 1917. Although these bodies and the MRC seemed
to have made some progress when they sponsored specific
research, there were many other investigations into the
disease that were haphazard and covered the same ground.
No new knowledge was gleaned after WL Brown’s study at
St Bartholomew’s Hospital in 1915.
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